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German Social Democracy is faced with tremendous challenges of societal and economic 
changes: party dealignment, a bourgeoisifying of society, the rise of media democracy and 
economic and cultural globalisation. The party’s reaction – a third order change in its 
ideological objectives and a respective adjustment in its short term policy programme as the 
leading governing party in the red-green coalition (AGENDA 2010) – is being investigated 
under the conditions of bounded rationality of voters and against the backround of an 
unprecedented loss in acceptance by the electorate as well as the ordinary party member.         
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The Economic Policies of German "Third Wayism" in the Light of Agenda 
Theory 
 
1.  The Reasons for this Choice of Subject 
 
For some time now a discussion has been raging on the future of German Social Democracy.
1 
The discussion differentiates somewhat roughly between the "traditionalists" and the 
"modernisers", and this characterisation is perhaps fitting if the position of the "traditionalists" 
is understood as the preservation of the traditional interpretations of basic Social Democratic 
values, while the "modernisers" press for an up-to-date adjustment of these interpretations to  
changing general conditions (cf. Seeleib-Kaiser 2004 and Heise 2003). The SPD is facing 
huge challenges, the like of which it has not had to meet for a long time in its 140 year-old 
history: 1) Internally it is threatened with being pushed to breaking-point by a dispute which 
goes far beyond the usual arguments between the orientation of the leading élite of a 
governing party towards power and the orientation of the party basis towards concrete issues. 
In accordance with the Hirschman options, for the first time in its history a membership vote 
has been launched (voice option) to commit the party leadership to the maintenance of 
traditional values, and at the same time the SPD is facing a wave of resignations (exit option) 
which is without precedent. 2) Approximately two years after the extremely narrow election 
victory of the red-green governing coalition in 2002 and an election result of 38% for the 
SPD, the party is losing support among the electorate to a degree previously unknown: 
elections to parliaments of the Laender and the Communes end with historical defeats
2, in the 
"Sunday surveys" the SPD gets only 25-27% of the votes – a historical low. 
 
The background to this development is the political reform package "AGENDA 2010" of the 
federal red-green government under Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, which combines labour 
market and social policy measures that are the core of the concept of a "Third Way"
3: the state 
should let go its solicitous clutch of its unemancipated citizens and concentrate on the 
encouragement of individual self-provision and self-initiative – the ‘activating or enabling 
state’ instead of the ‘active state’ of traditional Social Democratic concepts. Social justice 
should no longer be related primarily to outcomes (interference in the market-determined 
result of the distribution of income) but to the starting-point: inclusion, i.e. participation in 
societal processes – particularly the labour market – is, following Anthony Giddens' (1996; 
1998; 2000) seminal political concept of the "Third Way", seen as a priority even if this 
means increasing social distinctions: social is that which creates work.
4 
 
                                                 
1 The discussion is taking place primarily in the "theoretical journals" of the major Social Democratic ideological 
tendencies – "Sozialistische Politik und Wirtschaft" (socialist politics and economics), "Perspektiven 
Demokratischer Sozialismus" (perspectives of democratic socialism), "Berliner Republik" (Berlin republic), 
"Neue Gesellschaft/Frankfurter Hefte" (new society/Frankfurt notebooks) and "Internationale Politik und 
Gesellschaft" (international politics and society) – but, in addition, in critical social scientific journals – e.g. in 
"Blaetter fuer deutsche und internationale Politik" (pages for German and international politics), "Initial – 
Berliner Debatte" (initial – Berlin debate), "Prokla" (=Probleme des Klassenkampfes: problems of the class 
struggle) and "Sozialismus" (socialism) – and also in academic journals such as "Politische Vierteljahresschrift" 
(political quarterly). 
2 In Saxony, once the cradle of German Social Democracy, the SPD dropped to a one digit electoral outcome 
(9,8%) at the 2004 state elections – only 0,6 percentage points ahead of the neo-fachist NPD.  
3 On the politics of the "Third Way" cf. among others Hombach 2000; Schroeder 2000; Blair/Schroeder 1999; 
Vandenbroucke 1999; Arestis/Sawyer 2003; Sander 2003. 
4 Frenzel (2003) describes this as a change from "policies against markets" via "policies within markets" to 
"policies favouring markets".   4
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a = Effect according to the Walrasian market paradigm, which is presently dominant in academia and in 
the media; 
b = "new centre voters" understood as "members of the careerist milieu, of the new groupings of 
employees and self-employed, particularly in the information and service industries" (Grundwertekommission 
1999)
5, who conduct "pocketbook voting"; 
c = "traditional Social Democratic voters" understood as 
sociotropically voting supporters of a distributive workers' society
6; + = positive/advantage, - = 
negative/disadvantage, ° = not unequivocal, °+ = tendency towards advantage, °- = tendency towards 
disadvantage 
 
The implementation of these ideas (cf. Table 1), which Gerhard Schroeder defends with the 
mantra of the lack of an alternative and continual threats to resign and which he enforces on 
the party (and the country) from the top down (cf. Luik 2004), leads to measures some of 
which the SPD until recently (before the general election in November 2002) explicitly 
rejected and which were at any rate associated more with the political ideas of the 
conservative political camp (cf. Seeleib-Kaiser 2002: 493f.): the reduction of protection 
against unlawful dismissal, the integration of unemployment relief and social assistance, the 
sharpening of the regulations concerning the reasonableness of job offers, real reductions in 
pensions, the expansion of the low-wage sector and many more. 
 
In the following it will be attempted to explain these developments – the re-orientation of the 
Social Democracy in its economic and social policy core competencies combined at the same 
time with a huge loss of support and of the ability to form allegiance – in a model of bounded 
rational behaviour. In order to do so, first, in contrast to the traditional "rational or public 
                                                 
5 Duerr/Walter (2001: 184) speak of "Hedomaten" = hedonistic materialists.  
6 Duerr/Walter (2001: 184) call this group "realistic activists", who are characterised not by socio-structural 
origin but by a stable set of values.    5
choice model", which will not be used here because of its numerous consistency problems,
7 
an agenda model will be developed at some length (Part 2), which promises to be able to take 
better account of the particular features of modern democracies – the characteristic of politics 
in a media democracy as an "event".
8 Finally, on this basis some propositions for an 
interpretation of the strategic policy orientation of the Social Democracy will be presented 
(Part 3) and a – perhaps daring – alternative proposed (Part 4). 
 
2. The Agenda Model – or: Economic Policy in a media democracy 
 
The public choice model attempts to escape the accusation of ideology
9 levelled at political 
economy by placing "interests" on a microeconomic foundation and virtually scientificating 
them. The results of the public choice model – the failure of the state or of democracy, which 
could lead to some problematical conclusions – are presented as being "value-free", and the 
word "ideology" is integrated into the analysis exclusively as a signal which lowers 
information costs. Public choice is thus, so to speak, the new political economy of the post-
ideological epoch. However, when the dominance of the public choice approach is set in 
contrast to its problematical assumptions and its hitherto unsolved theoretical inconsistencies, 
it can indeed be suspected that the results of a fundamental scepticism regarding the state may 
themselves be assumed to be ideologically embellished.
10 
 
a.  The Basic Model 
 
Although the agenda model of political economy accepts the assumption that participants in 
the "political market" (i.e. parties and voters) are guided by self-interest, at the same time it 
assumes that voters have only incomplete information and can therefore at best vote in a 
"bounded rational" way. Against this background ideologies (i.e. positive visions of society 
and thus the object of cognition of political economy) become unrenounceable supports for 
decisions in a complex environment. Ideologies supply patterns of interpretation in an 
increasingly complex world. Parties are then not simply "service enterprises" without their 
own concept of the world – a sort of "black box", which can be filled with the preferences of 
the median voter – which submit their political tenders, but producers of ideologies which 
aspire equally, via clear "branding" to both long-term allegiance (regular voters) and the 
maximisation of votes.
11 Finally, the preferences of the voters under these conditions cannot 
be assumed to be exogenously given and pure "pocketbook voting" can neither be assumed to 
                                                 
7 Only by unacceptably bending the rationality postulate can public choice theory explain why people vote at all, 
and the inner contradiction between well-informed "rational jokers" and "rational ignoramuses" shows the 
dilemma in which a theory finds itself which wishes to make political electoral behaviour an optimising calculus. 
8 Grosse Holtforth (2000) points out that the meaning of the media has until now been underestimated in the 
public choice model. 
9 The accusation of ideology is always made when group or class-specific interests are postulated as relevant to 
the behaviour of the state actors, without this being adequately proven empirically or theoretically. "Ideology" is 
then translated as the conscious misinterpretation of social events; it becomes the cognitive subject or a 
substitute for cognition. 
10 Lars Udehn (1996: 194f.) says on this: "The main function of the assumption of self-interest seems to be 
ideological, in the sense that it favours market solutions (...) – at least according to traditional economic analysis, 
which sees in the market the sole institution with the wonderful ability of turning private vice into public virtue. 
In politics, on the contrary, it leads to suboptimal waste and serfdom. Ergo: the best society is a free market 
society.” 
11 Occasionally the dissolution of socio-structural ties (milieus) to parties (dealignment) is considered to mean 
the end of ideological branding. In fact, however, the opposite is true: the less the influence of the milieu, the 
more important are the ideological ties in the form of "brands" or "signals"; cf. Beyme 2000. Snyder/Ting (2002) 
have constructed a formal model of political parties as informative “brands” to voters.   6
be a realistic nor a generally valid behaviour (cf. Iversen 1994; Kalyvas 1996; 
Przeworski/Sprague 1986). 
 
The voting behaviour of the electorate depends on a whole number of factors – socio-
structural conditioning (milieus which create party loyalties), qualifications and the capacity 
to digest information,
12 a hegemonial concept of society which can be regarded as given in the 
short term (macro-climate) and dominant (economic) policy paradigms which can change in 
the short term – which may, of course, vary over time in their weighting and characteristics 
and which vary considerably individually. The lower the qualification and the ability to digest 
information of the individual voter, the greater the dependence on ideologies or other 
rationales which determine behaviour (e.g. party loyalties and party identification) – it can 
therefore be assumed that the median voter is the least ideologically committed (he needs the 
ideology as a behavioural crutch the least) and the most typical "pocketbook voter". 
 



















Under these conditions, however, the median voter will lose his power of influence in favour 
of the party median voter. We only need to assume that behind the usually assumed 
unimodal distribution of voters there is a clear ideological distinction (formation of camps) 
with a largely insulated electorate (cf. Figures 1 and 2). The centripetal tendency of the party 
programmes towards the median voter is now not at all certain, because every ideological 
change of position of a party towards the median voter and away from the party median voter 
(regular voter) involves the risk of losing more votes than it gains (cf. 2.2). This depends 
decisively, however, on the quantitative relationship between regular and floating voters on 
the one hand and on the "mobility"
13 of the regular voters. The higher the mobility of the 
regular voters – which can be assumed more in the case of power-oriented regular voters 
("office seeking parties") than in that of regular voters oriented towards concrete issues 
                                                 
12 Qualifications and the ability to digest information are only proxies for basic requirements for the rational 
dealing with the political choice of vote. It is certainly not intended to claim that the more highly qualified make 
"better" voting decisions that the less qualified. 
13 By "mobility" we mean ideological flexibility within a particular party; cf. Sanchez-Cuenca 2004. 
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(“policies seeking parties”) – the lesser is the risk of an undue loss of votes and therefore the 
greater is the median voter's power of influence. 











Source: Schaub (1998: 100) 
 
In a world in which the voting decisions of individuals are determined to a large degree by the 
ability of the parties to sell their policies – and this implies ideological visions (concepts of 
the world and models) just as much as programmes for action in the medium term (for day-to-
day political activity) – i.e. to make them into a "brand" which creates long-term allegiances, 
particular importance attaches to communication and, in particular, the communication media. 
Whereas the communication media previously consisted of traditional forms such as print 
media, party meetings and personal networks (which is why the party members played a 
major role as multipliers), today we can concentrate largely on the modern mass media such 
as TV, newspapers and the internet. Media are not a "neutral" transmitter between the parties 
and the voter: they filter and form to a decisive degree the information and ideological 
positions which they transport according to various criteria: 
 
•  basic ideological position (this is true essentially of media tied to parties or religious 
institutions) 
•  economic interests (the media as an enterprise, but also the media as "stage-setting" 
agencies which are looking for customers) 
•  basic ideological position of the media élites.
14 
 
In Table 2 the different levels of communication are summarised schematically (cf. 
Sarcinelli/Schatz 2002): the media assume responsibility for the process of "agenda setting", 
i.e. they communicate political agendas (issues, contents, appraisals) to the voters, and the 
policy agenda setting, i.e. they inform the political parties as to "public opinion". The parties 
are left only with agenda formation, i.e. the attempt to get certain issues and their 
articulation (cf. 2.3) onto the list of issues which are accepted by the media as agenda setters, 
and to submit interpretations. In the policy agenda building process the political party, in 
turn, must keep its ear tuned to the voter; here the entire process becomes reflexive, because 
                                                 
14 The concept of the élite is difficult to define precisely. In the research on élites these are those circles of people 
which are in a position to have a definitive influence on political and economic decisions; cf. e.g. Buerklin et al. 
1997, Hartmann 2001.   8
the policy orientation of the voters is in turn essentially determined by the agenda setting of 
the media. 
 
Table 2: Interaction of Media, Parties and Voters 
Direction of the Effect  Process 
parties Î media  agenda building 
media Î parties  policy agenda setting 
media Î voters  agenda setting 
voters (lobbies) Î parties  policy agenda building 
           
 
The central role of the media – occasionally the word Media Democracy (Mediokratie) is 
used (e.g. Meyer 2002) – now becomes obvious (they participate in 3 out of 4 processes), 
particularly since the political parties de facto no longer have their own, unfiltered access to 
the voters, and the voter has almost no possibility of procuring information "at first hand". 
The central role of the media, however, also forces (economic) policy to become subordinate 
in a way which has been described as "colonisation" and makes the agenda setting and the 
agenda building process into a kind of "politainment" (cf. Doerner 2001). This places 
particular demands on (economic) policies which are far beyond any rational economic 
expediency: 
 
•  the stage-setting potential of the content of politics (symbols, novelty etc.) 
•  the stage-setting ability of the political élites (promoters) 
•  the campaigning ability of the political party as an organisation. 
 
The general situation in society now comes into focus, in which the media-managed agenda 
building and agenda setting process takes place: hegemonial societal models or concepts 
(macro climate) such as collectivism or individualism, scepticism of the market or the state, 
solidarity or competition, must first be assumed to be given for the political process based on 
election cycles. The macro climate is a kind of perception filter, a policy constraint. In 
addition there exist dominant "issue frameworks" or policy programmes (micro climate) such 
as supply or demand-oriented policies, the stabilisation of prices or the business climate, 
deficit spending or zero deficits, in the formation of which the media play a decisive role. 
Between the micro and macro climates there are clearly recognisable relationships of internal 
consistency, but no direct dependencies
15 - we will turn to this again in section 2.c. 
 
 
b.  The Concept of the Loss Function 
 
The basic models of both the public choice and the agenda approach abstract from the 
possibility of deliberate non-voting, of abstention or, as Albert O. Hirschman put it, the exit 
option of the voter. In public choice theory this is understandable to a certain extent, since it is 
assumed that the rational voter will always decide in favour of the party "to which he is 
nearest" – he thus always uses his voice option. In agenda theory, however, which assumes 
the existence of camps based on ideologies between which voter migration is at least limited, 
an exit option has to be developed in addition to the voice option. I base myself here on the 
work of Siegfried F. Franke (2000: 53ff.) and the fundamentals quoted there.  
 
                                                 
15 Merkel (2001a; 2001b) states that the macro climate limits the feasible set of policy orientations (i.e. of the 
micro climate).   9





















The starting-point is again a bi-modal distribution in a left-right spectrum. In addition to the 
voter distribution functions loss functions are now also introduced (dotted lines in Figure 3). 
The loss functions describe the radius of a party and the extent of the exodus (into non-voting 
or even into the electorate of another party) if there is a difference between the individual 
point of view and the position of the party (which is determined here by the party median 
voter). In Figure 3 the shaded areas indicate the respective potential loss of voters, whereby 
the very small area of intersection can be understood as definite non-voters, while at least 
those "loss-voters" of the left-wing party from the right-wing spectrum could potentially 
become voters of the right-wing party (floating voters) and vice versa.  
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Figure 4 depicts the effects of a shift in party ideology from PML1 to PML2 in the direction of 
the median voter Me. With the "centring" of the left-wing party there is a change in the loss 
function (dashed line) and a change in the radius from AB to A'B' – it is assumed here that the 
ideological mobility of the party members and supporters is quite low, which does not seem 
unrealistic for the members and supporters of left-wing parties who are interested in concrete 
issues. It is immediately convincing that the loss of voters – which consists largely of 
disappointed voters who migrate into the group of non-voters – is clearly greater than the gain 
of voters in the centre – which is determined by an increase in voters in the right-wing 
spectrum and the "awakening" of non-voters. Nor should too much hope be placed on floating 
voters (from the potential of the right-wing party, which is not examined in further detail 
here), as the loss function of the right-wing party in this spectrum (cf. Figure 3) is small. 
 
c.  The Framing Concept of Economic Policy 
 
In agenda theory two concepts which we have not yet examined in detail play a particular 
role: the macro climate and the micro climate. We defined the macro climate as dominant 
models and concepts of the world, which as a "political constraint" describe a framework for 
perception which is given in the short term. The micro climate was described as "public 
opinion" – essentially created by the media – about the ruling or hegemonial policy 
programmes, which make up the agenda setting process. The framing concept can now grant 
us some insight into this part of the economic policy marketing between agenda building and 
agenda setting. 
 
By "framing" we mean the "simplification of complex structures and their evolving into 
decision alternatives" (cf. Seibel 2002: 225; own translation) or a "general construction of 
situations, processes and appraisals of an imagined construed reality" (Ebert 2001: 251; own 
translation). "Framing" is therefore a process of communication, which provides the 
perception of problems, their interpretation (at the policy level), the supply of instruments and 
the mise en scène in an intricate, complex world (an overwhelming supply of information and 
a limited capacity to absorb it) between the appearance of (economic) problems and the 
combatting of them (via economic policy). As a rule, we differentiate between different types 
of frame as different preliminary structures of the construed reality which are based on one 
another: 
 
Frame type I: This takes (economic) policy concepts as base lines for the interpretation of 
reality in the form in which they emerge directly from the activity of the government or 
within the framework of which we perceive government activity. 
 
Frame type II: The actors involved – political parties, their representatives and associations 
(lobbies) – attempt to achieve interpretation certainty by means of ideological distinctions, 
value judgements etc. By creating connotations, they give themselves a "brand image" which 
creates bonds in the "trust market" of politics. 
 
Frame type III: This consists of the great, societal concepts of basic values, which are only 
seldom explicitly spoken of – at least in the political process oriented towards the short to 
medium term – but about which there is a non-verbal preliminary understanding. 
 
The metacultural frame type III largely corresponds to the macro climate; frame type II 
determines the ideological location (and marketing) of the political parties – this type of 
frame, too, shows a considerable inertia since an ideologically vacillating party can offer little   11
certainty of interpretation and will therefore hardly be able to gain confidence. However, 
some frames of type II are certainly able to change in the medium to long run, if for example 
frame type III contains a change in societal values and guiding principles. Frame type I, 
finally, determines the perception framework in which (economic) policy takes place or in 
which it can be empowered to act. It describes something akin to the formation of "common 
sense" as a pattern of interpretation and as a rationale for activity. In the extension of the 
agenda building process it is therefore important not only to identify and address economic 
policy goals, i.e. to put them on the political agenda ("that which is talked about" and for 
which solutions are expected), but also to form (or to frame) the perception of problems and 
thus to set a precedent for approaches to solutions and frames of type II. 
 
The success of a largely uniform neoliberal framing process (type I), which can be explained 
by the problems of alternative (Keynesian) framing in the stagflation phase at the end of the 
1970s, the increasing dominance of the neoclassical-monetarist paradigm in academia and in 
political consulting (e.g. by the "Sachverstaendigenrat" = German Council of Economic 
Experts) and the increasingly uniform acceptance of this interpretation of reality by the mass 
media, can also be seen, finally, in the fact that a number of neoliberal myths – e.g. the 
inability of national macropolicy to act in the epoch of globalisation, the zero deficit as the 
guiding rule for financial policy, and many others – obtain semi-religious agreement even 
deep within the Social Democratic leadership (cf. e.g. Meng 2002: 98ff.)
16 
 
d.  Critical Evaluation 
 
The agenda theory of political economy largely severs the band between zweckrational 
(instrumentally rational) policy orientation and the reality of (economic) policy which is tied 
to specific interests or to society. It is not, however, the inability of autopoietic subsystems to 
communicate and control, as in Luhmann's system theory, which enforces this insight, but the 
power of the mass media to communicate and to set the stage (symbol politics; cf. Edelman 
1971). Neither the fundamental capacity to control nor the necessity of control will be 
contested here, therefore, but the willingness to control of the (economic) policy actor in the 
sense of a zweckrational orientation ('general welfare'). 
 
The essential problem with the agenda approach of political economy lies in the fact that it is 
unable to supply a prescriptive theory which could make prognoses concerning clear election 
results or policies. It therefore succeeds at best in making tentative statements and supplying 
perspectives concerning election tactics.
17 But it is nevertheless able to provide interesting 
insights into the extent to which (economic) policy programmes for action actually become 
politically powerful and effective. This depends essentially on the following: 
 
•  Whether and how a political programme (policy level) is subservient to the infotainment 
requirements of the media. 
•  What serves the interests of the media as economic enterprises and as tendency 
enterprises. The greater the economic orientation of the media enterprises (as opposed to 
the ideological orientation of party media or religious media) the stronger is the 
                                                 
16 "Thus a – ... – completely functionally understood religion, here above all as 'the giving of meaning through 
mythologising', contributes decisively to the stabilisation of every (...) order. Religious embellishment – of no 
matter what kind – lends the factuality of dominance the dignity of the normative" (Hitzler 2002: 42; own 
translation.) 
17 This does correspond, however, to the usual demands which can at best be made of the analysis of voter 
behaviour and which can only be fulfilled e.g. in the standard reference to the social democracy (Kitschelt 1994).   12
enterprise-friendly bias of the agenda setting process ('systematic happiness of the 
capitalists'; cf. Dowding 1996: 71ff.) 
•  How large the homogeneity of the opinion-forming élites in the media, parties and 
associations is. The more heterogeneous the social origin and the sociocultural 
environment, the more dissonant is the micro climate and the more ideologically diffuse 
the societal macro climate. 
 
3. Social Democracy between Orientation towards the Median Voter and Ideologising – 
Some Strategic Conclusions ... 
 
(Economic) policy cannot be understood as the zweckrational implementation of necessities 
under continually changing general conditions. This view can probably even be followed by 
political professionals such as Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder or Federal Economics Minister 
Wolfgang Clement. Their continual references to alleged necessities must not, therefore, be 
interpreted as the expression of a firm belief in the purposive functionality of government 
activity, but is, rather, part of a communication and marketing strategy: here the pragmatic 
doer, the moderniser of "Germany Ltd." is created and at the same time agreement within the 
party to "hard choices" – political measures which tend to damage some (previous?) regular 
voters in the short run, then to improve their lot (cf. Table 1) – is demanded. This is 
particularly important because hidden behind the modernisation and reform policies of the 
"Third Way" is not only a change in the economic and social policy instruments but a new 
interpretation of Social Democratic values and visions (cf. Seeleib-Kaiser 2002).
18 
 
Gerhard Schroeder is attempting to lead the SPD to a new course, which is intended to 
preserve its long-term ability to govern. In line with his own experience  of life – and the role 
of such personal factors in the formulation of government and party activity should not be 
underestimated (cf. Meng 2002: 47ff.) – he places more faith in strongly  individualistic and 
meritocratic elements than has until now been regarded by Social Democrats as desirable.
19 
He sees in this the "feasible set" of Social Democratic policies (frame type II) in the 
neoliberal, globalised epoch (under the conditions of hegemonial neoliberal frame types I and 
III) – i.e. in view of objective and subjective changes in the general conditions and political 
restrictions (cf. Merkel 2001a; 2001b). Schroeder and the pragmatists who determine policy 
cannot imagine placing themselves outside of the discourse which is defined by almost all 
societal élites (frame type I) or even contributing to keeping the societal discourse open and 
plural. Is, then, the acceptance of neoliberal hegemony the necessary way for Social 
Democracy at the beginning of the 21
st century?
20 Must the party accept the "hard choices", 
the logic of necessity of the world market, just as the Godesberg
21 Social Democracy needed 
                                                 
18 Even the famous revisionism debate of the early 20th century and the discussion of the Godesberg Programme 
were essentially discussions about instruments (property, the market and state intervention) and not about the 
objectives of Social Democratic politics. According to Peter Hall's (1993) categorisation, until now it has been a 
case of changes of the first (instrument setting) or second order (instruments), but only the "politics of Third 
Wayism" can be understood as a change of the third order (objectives). 
19 Franz Walter (2003: 52) describes this characteristic in the following words: "A group which from a 
subordinate position at first behaves in a very emancipative way, which is very determined and full of energy in 
putting forward its own objectives, finally achieves these objectives, rises up, leaves the position of 
subordinance, and now builds a new establishment. In the moment of its own success – ... – it becomes 
conservative, defends its new status. It frees itself not only mentally and culturally, but also defends what it has 
achieved in a socially aggressive way – against those who have not succeeded. Aggressively the new rising stars 
distance themselves from those who have not kept up. And they do not want to pay maintenance for those left 
behind, because they have nothing to gain by doing so" (own translation). 
20 Kitschelt (1994: 287ff.) can be thus interpreted.  
21 At the Godesberg convention in 1959, the SPD accepted a party programme which deliberated it from a 
Marxist interpretation of the world.    13
the definitive abandonment of its Marxist roots as a prerequisite for long-term success – 
without leading this to a final splitting of the party? 
 
From the point of view of agenda theory this change in Social Democratic party ideology – 
which in its convergence towards the preferences of the median voter may also be understood 
as de-ideologising – and in the programme of action for the medium term (AGENDA 2010) is 
consistent if in the course of the "bourgeoisifying" of German society in fact a new party 
median voter type has arisen, whose interests (preferences) are clearly different from those of 
the previous party median voter (the "small man", who was addressed by the people's party of 
the 1970s and 1980s) (cf. Duerr/Walter 2001) and who is converging towards the 
(ideologically non-committed) median voter. The Schroeder SPD does in fact seem to be 
firmly convinced of this, when in strategy papers it states that precisely this concentration on 
the "small man" will not be able to produce majorities in the future any longer.
22 The 
components of the economic and social policies of the "Third Way" presented in Table 1 are 
therefore directed consistently towards the material interests of this new clientele. The loss of 
support which can nevertheless be observed can be explained against this background by the 
fact that with the loss of party distinctions as a result of the convergence of the party 
ideologies the quality of craftsmanship of the business of politics and – particularly important 
in a market such as the politics market – the trust in the credibility of the actors involved are 
becoming increasingly important characteristics for differentiating between that which is 
actually indistinguishable. The long list of deficiencies in craftsmanship ("they simply don't 
know how to do it") and the breaking of election promises (e.g. the promise not to combine 
unemployment aid with social welfare payments was explicitly broken under the AGENDA 
2010) then lead to the (perhaps only short-term) withdrawal of confidence. 
 
On the other hand, however, the considerations of the agenda model imply for the Social 
Democracy that the SPD should again place a greater emphasis on its programmatic 
discussion than some of the leading pragmatists claim: particularly the SPD was always a 
party guided by concrete issues and values, which understood itself not only as a basis for 
power (cf. Walter 2002: 259 and Kitschelt 1994: 164ff.) In this case, however, clear socio-
political visions are an essential part of the "brand ": with "solidarity", "equality of 
opportunity" and "social justice" the SPD has been in possession of widely known and 
accepted values for more than a century, which in the present political arena can still be 
understood as essential characteristics of the SPD alone. However, it must be accepted that 
the interpretation of these values can undergo changes in the course of time and the profile of 
the party will depend essentially on the extent to which it succeeds in making these 
interpretations visible and understandable and powerful in action. The Social Democracy of 
the Godesberg Programme threw class-struggle ballast over board by endeavouring to realise 
the above values within a capitalist society and by posing the question of the instruments 
instead of the question of the system, which was increasingly felt to be unrealistic: with 
"social policy", "full employment" and "co-determination" the values could be concretised 
and finally, with "institutionalised Keynesianism", a set of economic and social policy 
instruments could be supplied – a "gift from heaven" as Adam Przeworski (1985) once called 
it.
23 The re-interpretation of these values by the "Third Way"-SPD in the sense of a shift from 
                                                 
22 "In the election campaign of 1998 the social groups were discovered anew which were to support this 
modernisation: the occupational categories of the 'new centre'. The SPD election manifesto named them: 'highly 
qualified workers, forward-looking and committed managers and entrepreneurs, innovative and flexible small 
businessmen, craftsmen and self-employed, courageous founders of new firms, excellently educated computer 
specialists, doctors and engineers, inventive technicians and scientists' " (Vester 2000: 17f.; own translation.) 
23 In the concepts of agenda theory the "traditional" Social Democratic economic policy of the Godesberg 
Programme supplied the fitting frame type II, which harmonised optimally with the hegemonial model of   14
an active, egalitarian social policy to an activating social policy which strengthens social 
distinctions, from full employment to pure employability and from participative co-
determination to the exclusively locationally oriented concept of human resource management 
has to date apparently spread little fascination, is (still) not understood by the majority as a 
project which provides meaning and identity, and in the creation of the concept of "civil 
society" has so far also been unable to develop any visionary power. Gerhard Schroeder's 
surrender of the post of party chairman to Franz Muentefering in early 2004
24 can therefore be 
interpreted as an attempt to disguise the reform "of the third order" (re-interpretation of the 
values) as a necessary adjustment of the instruments (AGENDA 2010) to the continuingly 
valid values (reform "of the second order") in order to reconcile the party median voter with 
the median voter (i.e. to increase – positively subliminally – the ideological mobility of the 
party median voter). At least in the short term the calculation does not yet seem to have 
worked, but it is still too early to judge this strategy's chances of success. 
 
4. ... and an Alternative Interpretation 
 
The analyses of voter mobility in the past elections, which brought considerable losses for the 
SPD, on the one hand speak against such an interpretation, however: instead of the mass 
desertion to the conservative political camp in the political centre, the abstention of many 
traditionally regular voters can be observed (cf. Figure 5). On the other hand the basic 
assumption of the change in the position of the party median voter is highly disputed (cf. 
Vester 1999). And finally, Gerhard Schroeder's resignation from the party chair would hardly 
be understandable if the "politics of the Third Way" were in fact a reflection of changes in the 
preferences of the party median voter.
25 Rather, it can be suspected that it is the processes of 
voter migration indicated in Figure 4 – particularly between the group of regular voters and 
the non-voter camp – which can be observed in Germany since the federal elections of 
2002.The numerous resignations from the party
26 can also be interpreted as an expression of 
the shift in the "reach" of the party and as a utilisation of the exit option for protest in view of 
the shift of party ideology away from the preferences of the party median. 
 
Figure 5: Mobility of social democratic voters in recent elections (2003-2004) 
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solidaristic collectivism of the 1960s and 1970s (frame type III) and the dominant interpretations of reality of 
standard Keynesian origin (frame type I). 
24 Franz Muentefering is regarded as a very ‘down to earth’ Social Democrat – which may be taken as 
‘traditional’ in the distinction made above. 
25 In that case the communication strategy would have needed to be changed, but not the personnel.  
26 According to a study of the POLIS institute of electoral research, in 2002 and 2003 the party lost 65.000 
members (about 10%), in the first three quarters of 2004 another 40.000 left, cf. NOZ (2004).      15
Note: Net mobility of SPD voters as compared to previous election. Bavarian state election in 
September 2003, Hessian and Lower Saxony state elections in February 2003, European Parliament 
elections in June 2004 
Source: Infratest dimap, various election reports 
 
It would then not simply be Schroeder's endeavour to manage the SPD from the top down as 
if it were a political enterprise which goes against the grain in large sectors of the membership 
and the potential voters, but it would also be the fundamental course – the "AGENDA 2010" 
– which would present problems, at least according to the considerations of the agenda model: 
with the explicit abandonment of (its own) ideological positioning the political management 
renounces a necessary unique characteristic, without which it will be difficult to position a 
"brand" with the power to create permanent allegiance. This deficit is particularly fatal if the 
"policy concept of medium range" places its bets essentially on reforms as an objective in 
themselves, as a symbol of decisiveness and the ability to act. Especially when the social 
reforms attack established positions in the sense of "hard choices" and thus have an effect on 
income distribution, for a Social Democratic government it is a question of survival that it is 
trusted to be able to maintain the social balance – and at least at present there is very much to 
indicate that the Social Democratic Party median voter continues to demand this (ideological 
immobility; cf. Table 1). The turn towards the "new centre voter" has not (so far) been 
followed by the party median voter and has been punished with migration into the non-voter 
camp (cf. Figure 4). The party chairman (Franz Muentefering) as a new integration figure will 
equally have problems if the party median voter suspects that he is only a "figurehead" of 
"Third Wayism" or if the courted median voter fears a turning away from his preferences (e.g. 
through a symbolic political instrument such as the controversially discussed dues for the 
provision of training positions (Ausbildungsplatzabgabe)). 
 
The clear profession of an ideological alternative in the party spectrum, however, only has a 
likelihood of success according to the agenda model if this positioning can take place without 
weakening too much the reach of the party on the right-wing periphery (the centre of the 
ideolgical spectrum; cf. Figure 2). This danger naturally exists, however, in a "hostile" 
framing environment.
27 Therefore, if we take the media's need for setting the stage as our 
starting-point, and if, on the other hand, we dispute neither the general neoliberal framing of 
the issues (frame type I) nor the individualistic meritocratic macro climate (frame type III), 
then the Social Democracy must at least engage in a discourse on modernisation (reform of 
the second order) and cannot simply return to the instrumentation (i.e. the simple defence) of 
the "Keynesian welfare state" of the old type. This means both the orientation towards a 
distinctively distributive objective and the paying of attention to new instruments of macro-
economic intervention and socio-political reform and their powerfully symbolic mise en scène 
in the media. Besides the filling with content
28 this also means the willingness to define issues 
independently – this is commonly described as "political leadership" and demands the 
authenticity which the Schroeder SPD was able to present in the event of the Iraq conflict 
(decisive for the last election). 
 
5. A Brief Summary 
 
On the basis of the agenda model of political economy it was attempted to explain the 
ideological change in the German Social Democratic Party under Gerhard Schroeder towards 
a "new centre" position and the concrete formation of its programme of activity for the 
                                                 
27 This experience was made by the SPD in the first phase following the assumption of government in 1998 
under the then party chairman and finance minister Lafontaine.  
28 Cf. Arestis/Sawyer (1998) or Heise (2001).   16
medium term (the AGENDA 2010) under the conditions of the bounded rationality of voters 
in a media democracy, and the parallel loss of votes by the SPD. 
 
It became apparent that the development is logical, i.e. politics capable of achieving a 
majority is now only possible within the (increasingly uniform) framework of issues 
determined by the media if it lastingly influences not only the standpoint of the median voter 
but also that of the party median voter. Under these conditions electoral success depends 
essentially on the party's power to set the scene and the loss of votes is due to massive inner-
party communication problems and weak craftsmanship. 
 
However, the empirical consideration of voter migration and party resignations indicates that 
another interpretation is possible: if the ideological mobility of the party median voter – 
despite indoctrination by the media – remains limited, the relinquishment of a clear 
ideological positioning can be understood as the renunciation of a social compass and signal 
function, which is punished by the loss of brand allegiance.   17
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